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Abstract
We analyze a simple model of bilateral bargaining under asymmet-
ric information where the seller of an object can not simply say "no"
by default to a buyer who is supposed to make a take-it-or-leave-it
oer. Rather, he must acquire this option before the actual bargaining
process begins. This choice is observable to the buyer, and hence, the
seller's prebargaining action might signal private information. We de-
velop a complete characterization of Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium in
pure and (strictly) mixed strategies for this game. Then the model is
compared to a standard bargaining setting in terms of the realization
of welfare enhancing propertyright changes.
KEYWORDS: Bargaining, Signalling.
JEL-Classication: D23, D82, L14

Author's address: Günther Lang, Universidade Nova de Lisboa, Faculdade de Econo-
mia, Travessa Estêvão Pinto (Campolide) 1099-032 Lisboa, Portugal.
Introduction
Ecient trade among economic agents requires a well-established property-
rights system that protects initial endowments as well as produced goods.
Without such an institution, incentives to exert eort are distorted as the
total (marginal) gains from individual performance do not fall exclusively to
the individual himself. It is frequently argued that the protection of property
rights has public good character, and indeed, police protection and criminal
investigation are provided on a collective base.
However, more basic instruments of protection against burglary and theft
are left to the individual or local level: door locks from family homes to in-
dustrial complexes are nanced by their owners, electronic video surveillance
systems and private security in condominiums and factories are also orga-
nized on an individual base, rms with internet presence spend considerable
amounts of money in the electronic protection of sensitive data that is only
for internal use. Clearly, one can argue that these instruments are rather
goods of private benet, or at most public goods on a restricted local level.
Nevertheless, there may well exist signicant scale eects in order to justify
joint provision of these goods and services.
On the other hand, the magnitude of investment undertaken by an in-
dividual party in the protection of its propertyrights in a certain object
may reveal (or conceal) signicant information as to the valuation of the
object by this party. Expenses made on protection may therefore be of value
in trade relationships under asymmetric information as a signalling device:
high valuation types of sellers could use this instrument for the purpose
of distinguishing themselves from low valuation types, inducing potentially
higher bids from buyers who are supposed to make a (rst) oer. Hence,
welfareenhancing exchanges in propertyrights may be promoted as com-
pared to a setting where scaleeects would justify joint supply of protective
measures.
We will formally analyze the eect of introducing a cost for having the
option to say "no" into a traditional model of bilateral bargaining where a
buyer makes a take-it-or-leave-it proposal to a seller (see Fudenberg and Ti-
role (1983), and (1991), Ch. 10, Sec. 2). The following section describes the
model, subsequently all equilibria of the game in pure and mixed strategies
are examined.
The Model
We consider a traditional one-shot single-oer bargaining game with asym-
metric information, with the extension that the seller can only veto the
transfer of the object in his possession if he has made an initial investment
in the protection of his propertyright. The setting where there is no invest-
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ment stage, and the seller can always say "no" is referred to as the standard
(bargaining) game.
We assume that for buyer (A) and seller (B) there are two possible types,
respectively: v 2 fv; vg for A, with a-priori distribution p(v); p(v)+p(v) = 1;
w 2 fw;wg for B, with a-priori distribution q(w); q(w)+q(w) = 1. The types
for both of the players stem from an independent draw. We will examine
the two relevant cases: the no-gap case with 0  w < v < w < v, and the
gap-case with 0  w < w  v < v. Concerning the amount k necessary for
the seller to invest in order to be able to decline the buyer's oer, we assume
that it is xed with 0  w < k < w.
The timing of the game is as follows:
(i) Nature decides independently, according to the distributions p(v) and
q(w), the types of both players and exclusively reveals to each of them
his own type.
(ii) Seller B decides whether or not to invest k. If he does not invest then
the object changes hands with a payo of 0 for the seller and v for the
buyer. Otherwise, the game continues with step (iii).
(iii) Buyer A makes an oer c to B.
(iv) Seller B decides whether or not to accept this oer. If he does, then
the object changes hands, with payos of c for B and v  c for A. If he
does not, B stays with the object and a payo of w, whereas A earns
0.
One could equally well imagine a setting where the seller rst invests and
then makes an oer to the buyer. This problem then is only of unilateral
asymetric information and trivial to solve: the seller invests i his maximal
expected payo over all his bids exceeds the cost k. In the game analyzed
here, however, a true signalling problem arises, in the sense that B's decision
to invest may reveal or hide information about his type.
We denote by Æ
k
(w) 2 f0; 1g B's behavorial strategy when asked whether
to invest (1) or not (0). This decision may be conditioned on B's type.
Analoguously, we denote by c(v) A's bid-strategy. By a(cjw) 2 f0; 1g we
designate B's acceptance (1) or refusal (0) of A's oer. This strategy as
well may depend on the history of the game revealed to B. The equilibrium
concept applied is that of perfect Bayesian equilibrium (see Fudenberg and
Tirole (1991), Ch. 8).
As a preliminary result, it is clear that B's type w always invests in equi-
librium because his valuation of the object exceeds the cost of the investment,
k < w. However, type w may invest as well, although his valuation is lower
than costs: in doing so he avoids revealing his type, which tendentially in-
creases the expected oer made by the buyer as compared to the case where
the latter knew that he faces B's type w.
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In order to show that private provision of propertyright protection may
well outmatch joint supply, we assume an alternative setting with n sellers
(owners) where public provision causes costs of G, independently of n, and
where G=n < k (so scaleeects are supposed to have turned public provision
into the less costly alternative). This public system is mandatory for all
sellers, with equal costsharing, and once it is implemented sellers and buyers
play the standard game with the sellers' default option to refuse an oer.
No-Gap Case: w < v < w < v
In what follows we will rst analyze existence of equilibrium in pure strate-
gies. Then we look at equilibria in (strictly) mixed strategies.
Theorem 1 (Separating Equilibrium) Separating equilibria do exist i
w  ~w :=
k   p(v)w
p(v)
: (1)
For all w  ~w, the following strategies constitute a separating equilibrium:
Æ
k
(w) = 0; Æ
k
(w) = 1, c(v) = w, c(v) = w, and
a(cjw) =

1 for c  w
0 for c < w
(2)
for all c and w, with beliefs at out-of-equilibrium-path information sets chosen
arbitrarily.
Proof: Out-of-equilibrium-path information sets can only be found at the
stage where B has to decide acceptance or refusal of A's oer. There, as well
as at information sets which are on the equilibrium path at this stage, it is
best for B to accept an oer that matches at least w, independently of B's
beliefs about A's type ; hence a() as given above is optimal.
Given that Æ
k
= 1 is observed, Bayes' rule requires A to believe in B's type
w. A's type v then just oers w, knowing that this oer will be accepted.
A's type v could induce w's acceptance only by incurring a loss. Since
w  ~w < w, he avoids just this. Therefore, c(v) = w and c(v) = w,
respectively, are optimal for the beliefs implied by the equilibrium strategies.
B's type w always invests: Without doing so his payo would be zero since
he could not recuse A's proposal, but having invested oers the opportunity
to say no and guarantees him a payo of w  k > 0. w  ~w (as given in (1))
implies that p(v) w+ p(v)w  k  0, and so w nds it optimal not to invest.
On the other hand, if (1) is not fullled, i.e. w > ~w, then w strictly prefers
to invest for any w > 0 since his reservation payo is w anyway. Hence, (1)
is also necessary for the existence of separating equilibria.
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Relationship (1) is equivalent to p(v) 
k w
w w
. The interpretation for the
existence of a separating equilibrium is that since the probability of meeting
A's type v is relatively low  and this type is the only who potentially oers
w  B's type w does not nd it worthwhile to invest.
Theorem 2 (Pooling Equilibrium) A pooling equilibrium does exist i
w  ~w :=
k   p(v)w
p(v)
(3)
and
w  w^ := v  
v   w
q(w)
: (4)
The following strategies constitute this equilibrium: Æ
k
(w) = 1; Æ
k
(w) = 1,
c(v) = w, c(v) = w, and a(cjw) as in (2). Beliefs at out-of-equilibrium-path
information sets can be chosen arbitrarily.
Proof: Out-of-equilibrium-path information sets can be found at the stage
where B has to decide acceptance or refusal of A's oer. By the same ar-
gument as in the proof of Theorem 1, a() is optimal o as well as on the
equilibrium path.
We have c(v) = w, since oering w would leave A's type v with a certain loss.
Oering w, however, attracts B's type w, and only this type. This event oc-
curs with probability q(w), leaving type v therefore with an expected payo
of q(w)(v   w) > 0.
A's type v oers c(v) = w i v   w  q(w)(v   w), which is equivalent to
(4). Otherwise he would oer only w, in which case both types of A would
bid only the low valuation. Then, however, w would not invest. Hence, (4)
is necessary for the existence of a pooling equilibrium.
B's type w invests, by the same (obvious) argument as in Theorem 1. Whether
w invests, given that (4) is fullled, depends: he invests i p(v)(w   k) +
p(v)(w   k)  0, which is equivalent to (3).
Hence (3) and (4) are necessary and sucient for the existence of a pooling
equilibrium.
In a pooling equilibrium, A's type v must nd it worthwhile to bid w.
This is the case if the probability of meeting B's type w is not too high;
indeed (4) is equivalent to q(w) 
v w
v w
. B's type w then invests as well if
the probability of meeting A's type v is suciently high, which is equivalent
to (3).
Existence of either type of equilibrium therefore depends on the relation-
ship between w^ and ~w:
w^  ~w : Separating equilibria do exist i w  ~w. Pooling equilibria do
exist i w  ~w. For w = ~w separating and pooling equilibria coexist
with an expected payo for B's type w of zero in both cases.
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w^ > ~w : Separating equilibria do exist i w  ~w. Pooling equilibria do exist
i w  w^. For ~w < w < w^ neither pooling nor separating equilibria
do exist: a) If A's type v would oer w, then B's type w where induced
to invest as well. However, w's frequency is too high in order to make
it worthwhile for v to do so, and b) the frequency of A's type v, who
in a separating equilibrium is supposed to oer w, is too high for B's
type w not to invest.
In the following we consider all cases of equilibria in (strictly) mixed
strategies that exist in addition to the pure-strategy equilibria already dis-
cussed.
Theorem 3 (Mixed-Strategy Equilibria) In the no-gap case the follow-
ing equilibria in (strictly) mixed strategies do exist:
(i) For
w < ~w :=
k   p(v)w
p(v)
(5)
the only mixed-strategy equilibria consist of the (pure) strategies from
the separating equilibrium of Theorem 1, with the exception that A's
type v mixes his bid c(v) on the interval [0; ~w].
(ii) For
w = ~w :=
k   p(v)w
p(v)
(6)
the following strategies constitute the set of all hybrid equilibria:
(prob(Æ
k
(w) = 1) = ; prob(Æ
k
(w) = 0) = 1   ); Æ
k
(w) = 1, c(v) = w
(for  = 0 any mixed strategy on [0; ~w] as in (i)), c(v) = w, and a(cjw)
as in (2), with   min(

; 1), where 

> 0 is the (unique) solution
to


q(w)


q(w) + q(w)
(v   w) = v   w: (7)
(iii) For
w > ~w :=
k   p(v)w
p(v)
(8)
then:
a) For q(w)(v w) = v w (i.e. w = w^), the pooling equilibrium from
Theorem 2 survives with the modication that A's type v mixes:
(prob(c(v) = w) = ; prob(c(v) = w) = 1   ), with   

,
where 

2 (0; 1) is the (unique) solution to
p(v)(w   k) + p(v)[

(w   k) + (1  

)(w   k)] = 0: (9)
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b) For q(w)(v w) > v w (i.e. w < w^), then the following strategies
constitute the set of all hybrid equilibria:
(prob(Æ
k
(w) = 1) = 

; prob(Æ
k
(w) = 0) = 1   

); Æ
k
(w) = 1,
c(v) = w, (prob(c(v) = w) = 

; prob(c(v) = w) = 1   

), and
a(cjw) as in (2), with 

and 

as dened in (ii) and (iii) a),
respectively.
In all cases, beliefs at out-of-equilibrium-path information sets can be chosen
arbitrarily.
Proof: (i) From Theorem 1 we know that B's type w nds it optimal not
to invest for any c(v)  ~w. Since ~w < w, B's type w rejects such an oer
anyway. Mixing on the interval [0; ~w] then has the same eect. The mixed-
strategy equilibrium is payo-equivalent to the separating equilibrium.
It remains to show that there are no other mixed-strategy equilibria. First
of all, in order to guarantee existence of a best response it is required to
assume that, on the equilibrium path, both types of B accept A's oer if
indierent between accepting and rejecting. Then (5) implies that w would
not invest even if A's type v oered w, and, on the other hand, if he invests
then A's type v would never oer more than w. Therefore, w never invests
in equilibrium, and so only the separating equilibrium from Theorem 1, with
mixing as just described, survives.
(ii) Given that (6) is satised, B's type w is indierent between investing
and not investing, provided that c(v) = w and c(v) = w; and therefore
he may mix. The lhs of (7) gives the expected payo of A's type v if he
bids w, whereby the rst term expresses the Bayesian updated probability
of type w given this type's mixed strategy. The rhs of (7) is type v's certain
payo if bidding w. There trivially exists a unique solution 

to (7) that is
positive but not necessarily below or equal to one. If B's type w mixes with
probability   min(

; 1) then the lhs of (7) is lower than or equal to the
rhs, and so it is optimal for type v to oer c(v) = w. If A's type v mixes
on [0; ~w] then  = 0 is optimal for B's type w, and moreover, if any strategy
from [0; ~w) is played with strictly positive probability then only  = 0 is
optimal.
(iii) a) and b) Given that (8) holds, B's type w is indierent between investing
and not investing if (9) is satised, and he strictly prefers to invest if the lhs
of (9) is strictly positive. 

=
p(v)(w k)+p(v)(w k)
p(v)(w w)
solves (9) and lies in the
interval (0; 1), whereas  < 

implies that the lhs is strictly positive. Hence,
if B's type w invest with probability one, then q(w)(v  w) = v  w implies
that A's type v is indierent between bidding w and w. If q(w)(v w) > v w
then the 

that solves (7) guarantees this indierence.
With the same argument as in Theorems 1 and 2, beliefs at the out-of-
equilibrium-path information sets are immaterial.
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It is important to note that for ~w < w < w^, in which case neither sepa-
rating nor pooling equilibria do exist, at least equilibrium in mixed strategies
can be guaranteed by part (iii) b) of the theorem.
Finally, we compare the expected eciency losses due to assymetric infor-
mation in the present model to those in the jointprovision scenario with the
guaranteed option to say "no" after the mandatory perhead share G=n is
paid (and after which seller and buyer play the standard model). Ineciency
in both models arises in case that a benecial trade between A and B does
not occur. For the no-gap case, in equilibrium, trade between B's type w and
any of A's types always is benecial and in fact takes place. However, in the
standard model, B's type w cannot realize the benecial trade with A's type
v if the probability of B's type w is too high, in particular if q(w) >
v w
v w
.
In the model discussed here, this case is consistent only with the separating
equilibrium and the mixed-strategy equilibria (i) and (ii). In any of these
equilibria, all welfare increasing transfers in property-rights do take place 
although not always voluntarily  but social cost consist of B's type w's
and/or w's investment k. Therefore, expected eciency losses are q(w)k in
the separating equilibrium, as well as in the mixed-strategy equilibrium (i),
and they amount to [q(w) + q(w)]k in case of mixed-strategy equilibrium
(ii). In the standard model they are G=n+ p(v)q(w)(v  w). Hence, having
investment in property-rights protection as a signalling device pays o i
k <
G
nq(w)
+ p(v)(v   w) in the rst two cases, and k <
G=n+p(v)q(w)(v w)
q(w)+q(w)
in
the last case. On the other hand, if q(w) <
v w
v w
, all ecient trades in the
standard model take place, in the model discussed here, however, there are
always social costs in terms of at least type w's investment k.
Gap Case: w < w  v < v
Theorem 4 (Pure-Strategy Equilibria) In the gap case
a) no separating equilibria do exist, and
b) a pooling equilibrium does exist i
(i) w  w^(v), where
w^(v) := v  
v  w
q(w)
; (10)
or
(ii) (w^(v)  w < w^(v) and w  ~w ( ~w given by (1))).
The following strategies constitute this equilibrium: Æ
k
(w) = 1; Æ
k
(w) = 1,
c(v) = w (case (i)), c(v) = w (case (ii)), c(v) = w, and a(cjw) as in (2).
Beliefs at out-of-equilibrium-path information sets can be chosen arbitrarily.
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Proof: w^(v) as given in (10) makes type v indierent between oering w
and w^(v) < w. Note that w^(v) < w^(v). Then, if w < w^(v), none of A's
types oers w. Hence, B's type w does not invest.
If w^(v)  w < w^(v), then c(v) = w and c(v) = w. Also type w then nds it
optimal to invest i w  ~w.
If w  w^(v), then both types of A bid the high valuation w. In this case,
both types of B nd it optimal to invest.
By the same argument as above, beliefs at out-of-equilibrium information
sets where B has to decide acceptance or refusal are irrelevant, and a() is
optimal.
Also in the gap case we now investigate equilibrium in (strictly) mixed
strategies.
Theorem 5 (Mixed-Strategy Equilibria) In the gap case the following
equilibria in (strictly) mixed strategies do exist:
(i) For w = w^(v): Æ
k
(w) = 1, Æ
k
(w) = 1, prob(c(v) = w) = ; prob(c(v) =
w) = 1  ), with   min(

; 1), c(v) = w, and a(cjw) as in (2).
(ii) For w^(v) < w < w^(v):
a) For w = ~w: (prob(Æ
k
(w) = 1) = ; prob(Æ
k
(w) = 0) = 1 ), with
1 >   

(v), c(v) = w, c(v) = w, and a(cjw) as in (2).
b) For w < ~w: (prob(Æ
k
(w) = 1) = 

(v); prob(Æ
k
(w) = 0) = 1  


(v)), (prob(c(v) = w) = 

; prob(c(v) = w) = 1 

), c(v) = w,
and a(cjw) as in (2).
(iii) For w = w^(v):
a) For w > ~w: Æ
k
(w) = 1, Æ
k
(w) = 1, c(v) = w, (prob(c(v) = w) =
; prob(c(v) = w) = 1  ), with   

, and a(cjw) as in (2).
b) For w = ~w: (prob(Æ
k
(w) = 1) = ; prob(Æ
k
(w) = 0) = 1 ), with
1 >   

(v), c(v) = w, c(v) = w, and a(cjw) as in (2).
c) For w < ~w: (prob(Æ
k
(w) = 1) = 

(v); prob(Æ
k
(w) = 0) = 1  


(v)), (prob(c(v) = w) = 

; prob(c(v) = w) = 1 

), c(v) = w,
and a(cjw) as in (2).
iv) For w < w^(v) < w^(v):
a) For w > ~w: (prob(Æ
k
(w) = 1) = 

(v); prob(Æ
k
(w) = 0) = 1  


(v)), c(v) = w, (prob(c(v) = w) = 

; prob(c(v) = w) = 1 

),
and a(cjw) as in (2).
b) For w = ~w: (prob(Æ
k
(w) = 1) = ; prob(Æ
k
(w) = 0) = 1 ), with


(v)    

(v), c(v) = w, c(v) = w, and a(cjw) as in (2).
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c) For w < ~w: (prob(Æ
k
(w) = 1) = 

(v); prob(Æ
k
(w) = 0) = 1  


(v)), (prob(c(v) = w) = 

; prob(c(v) = w) = 1 

), c(v) = w,
and a(cjw) as in (2).
Thereby, 

(v) is the (unique) solution to


(v)q(w)


(v)q(w) + q(w)
(v   w) = v   w; (11)


as given in (9), and 

is the (unique) solution to
p(v)[

(w   k) + (1  

)(w   k)] + p(v)(w   k) = 0: (12)
In all cases, beliefs at out-of-equilibrium-path information sets can be chosen
arbitrarily.
Proof: Given A's type v 2 fv; vg, he is indierent between oering w and w
i (11) holds. There is a unique solution to (11), and  < 

(v) ( > 

(v))
implies that type v strictly prefers bidding w (w). Also, 

(v) < 

(v), i.e.
A's high-valuation type v is willing to oer w at a higher probability of facing
B's type w as compared to his low-valuation type v.


as given in (9) marks B's type w's indierence between investing or not,
given that A's type v oers w and type v mixes on fw;wg. Consequently,
type w strictly prefers to invest (not to invest) i  < 

( > 

).
Analoguously, 

as given in (12) marks B's type w's indierence between
investing or not, given that A's type v oers w and type v mixes on fw;wg.
Note that 

is strictly positive and it may be greater than one. Type w then
strictly prefers to invest (not to invest) i  < min(

; 1) ( > min(

,1)).
Therefore, if w > w^(v), both types of A oer w even if both types of B
invest, and so there only exists the pooling equilibrium from Theorem 4.
With this knowledge we can now prove claims (i) to (iv).
(i) w = w^(v) implies that A's type v oers w and type v is indierent between
v and v, given that B's types pool. If type v then mixes with   min(

; 1)
it is optimal for B's type w to invest. On the other hand, if the latter would
invest with probability lower than one, then both of A's types should oer
w, inducing him to invest with probability one.
(ii) a) Given B's type w's mixing with 1 >   

(v), using (11) we see
that c(v) = w and c(v) = w are indeed optimal. Since w = ~w, B's type w
then indeed is indierent. On the other hand, if the latter would invest with
probability lower than 

(v), then both of A's types should oer w, inducing
him to invest with probability one.
(ii) b) Given B's type w's mixing with 

(v), c(v) = w is uniquely optimal,
whereas A's type v is indierent. Given that the latter mixes with 

, which
is indeed lower than one because of w < ~w, B's type w is indierent between
investing or not. If type w mixed with  < 

(v), then both types of A
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would oer w, inducing pooling. If he used  > 

(v), then c(v) = w and
c(v) = w were optimal, inducing type w not to invest because of w < ~w.
(iii) a) Given that both types of B pool, w = w^(v) implies that type v strictly
prefers oering w, whereas type v is indierent. By (9), B's type w then nds
it optimal to invest for   

. If type w did not invest with probability
one, then the optimal strategies for A's types would satisfy c(v)  w and
c(v) = w, inducing him to invest because of w > ~w.
(iii) b) For 1 >   

(v), c(v) = w and c(v) = w are optimal. Since w = ~w,
type w is indierent between investing and not doing so.  = 1 implies the
pure-strategy pooling equilibrium from Theorem 4.  < 

(v) would imply
c(v) = c(v) = w, making it uniquely optimal for type w to invest.
(iii) c) Given w's mixing with 

(v), type v is indierent, whereas type v
strictly prefers oering w. The former's mixing with 

then leaves B's type
w indierent whether to invest or not. For  < 

(v), both types of A would
oer w, inducing pooling of B's types.  > 

(v) then makes c(v) = w
uniquely optimal, and because of w < ~w, type w would not invest.
(iv) a) Given w's mixing with 

(v), c(v) = w is unique optimal choice of v,
whereas v is indierent. Hence, he may mix with 

. This, in turn, leaves
type w indierent between investing and not investing.  < 

(v) implies
c(v) = w or w and c(v) = w, making type w invest because of w > ~w. On
the other hand,  > 

(v) implies c(v) = c(v) = w, so that type w would
not invest.
(iv) b) For  2 [

(v); 

(v)], c(v) = w and c(v) = w are optimal, and
because of w = ~w, B's type w then is indierent between investing or not.
 < 

(v) implies c(v) = c(v) = w, making it worthwhile for type w to
invest.  > 

(v) induces c(v) = c(v) = w, which makes type w not to
invest.
(iv) c) Given that B's type w mixes with 

(v), A's type v is indierent
between oering w and w, whereas type v strictly prefers bidding w. Given
the former's mixing with 

, B's type w is just indierent.  < 

(v) implies
c(v) = c(v) = w, which makes it worthwhile for type w to invest.  > 

(v)
implies c(v) = w and c(v)  w, which makes it unattractive for type w to
invest because of w < ~w.
Finally, a(cjw) as in (2) is optimal for both of B's types, independently of
beliefs held about A's type.
Also in the gap-case we examine under which conditions the investment
in property rights protection as a signalling device can improve welfare as
compared to the joint supply/ standard model. In the latter, benecial
trade now may not take place between w and either v or v, depending on
whether q(w) > h(v) :=
v w
v w
, i.e. on whether B's type w's probability is too
high. Note that h(v) < h(v). Three cases are to be distinguished.
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q(w) > h(v) > h(v): Trade between w and neither v nor v takes place
in the standard model, causing social costs of G=n + q(w)[p(v)(v   w) +
p(v)(v w)]. In our signalling model, this case is consistent only with mixed-
strategy equilibrium iv). Given the cost of investment k, plus costs in terms
of non-realized benecial trades, in sub-cases a)  c) of iv) the possibility of
signalling provides higher welfare as compared to the standard model i
k <
8
>
>
>
<
>
>
>
>
:
q(w)p(v)(1   

)(v  w) +G=n


(v)q(w) + q(w)
sub-case a)
q(w)p(v)(v   w) +G=n
q(w) + q(w)
sub-case b)
q(w)[p(v)(v   w) + p(v)(v   w)(1  

)] +G=n


(v)q(w) + q(w)
sub-case c)
(13)
h(v) < q(w) < h(v): In this case, the standard model only precludes trade
between w and v, causing social costs of p(v)q(w)(v   w) +G=n. This con-
stellation is consistent only with pooling equilibrium (ii) and mixed-strategy
equilibrium (ii). In the rst case, also the signalling model precludes trade
between w and v, but it causes the cost of investment k. Hence, welfare as
compared to the standard model is lower since k > G=n. The same applies
for mixed-strategy equilibrium (ii) sub-case a). In sub-case b), there is trade
between w and v with probability 1   

; hence the signalling framework
provides higher welfare i k <
q(w)p(v)(1 

)(v w)+G=n


(v)q(w)+q(w)
.
q(w) < h(v) < h(v): All ecient trades take place in the standard model.
This case corresponds to pooling equilibrium (i), where they are realized as
well, at social costs of k, however. Hence, since k > G=n, the signalling
model displays lower social eciency.
Conclusion
We have analyzed a simple model of bargaining, modied by the feature
that the option to decline an oer must be acquired in advance. In the sym-
metric information case, only highvaluation sellers would buy this option.
However, if the sellers' type is private information, then also lowvaluation
sellers may undergo this costly investment in order to avoid revealing their
type. In the nogap case, this just happens if the ex-ante probability of
the lowvaluation type seller is suciently low, and that of a highvaluation
type buyer is suciently high. In the gap case, a separating equilibrium does
not exist at all because both types of buyers are supposed to make the same
(high) oer. On the other hand, also a pooling equilibrium may fail to exist if
the probability of the seller's lowvaluation type is too high, because in this
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case both types of the buyer would only oer the low price. Nevertheless,
equilibrium in mixed strategies can always be guaranteed.
Comparison with the jointsupply/standard bargaining model shows that
welfare may well increase under some circumstances if one introduces the
relatively more costly instrument of individual propertyrights defence. In
fact, if the ex-ante probability of the lowvaluation seller is too high, then
in the standard model, both types of buyers tend to make the same low
oer, inpeding benecial trades between highvaluation sellers and buyers.
Nevertheless, if costs of signalling, i.e. of buying the option to say "no", are
not too high, then this device will indeed guarantee that all ecient changes
in propertyrights do take place.
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